Excursus

Mark Liberman at Language Log has written a nice post about the charge that linguistic descriptivism is a manifestation of what Nietzsche calls slave morality. Liberman is right in claiming that this does not make sense, but for the wrong reasons, I think.

It is odd how so many who would cite Nietzsche in support of their ideological views end up espousing an ideology that is criticizable on Nietzschean grounds. And Kevin S is no execption:

At the end of the day, Descriptivism appears merely to be another form of Nietzsche’s concept of slave morality, which is the dominant morality of our day.

Let me confine myself to two sets of remarks, the first concerning Nietzsche’s attitude toward categorical demands, and the second concerning the distinction between the noble and slave moralities.

Prescriptivists are so-called because of the categorical demands they make on linguistic usage. Such demands (“Split not the infinitive”) are unconditional. The fact that splitting an infinitive may be the only way to say what you mean (“I eat sensibly to not get fat”) is deemed insufficient reason to transgress this norm. The fact that these prescriptions are categorical is sufficient to discredit their alleged Nietzschean heritage. Thus Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and Evil §31, describes “the taste for the unconditional” as “the worst of all tastes”. Moreover, the third essay of the Genealogy of Morals is largely devoted to arguing that categorical demands are the expression of ressentiment. If we are to take Nietzsche seriously here, this raises the question: Are prescriptivists resentniks?

A basic understanding of the distinction between noble and moral modes of evaluation in the first essay of the Genealogy of Morals also reveals Kevin’s charge to be senseless.

According to Nietzsche, the noble mode of evaluation grew spontaneously out of a positive sense of self. The basic concept, then is that of the good, the noble. The corresponding negative concept, the bad, is a subsequently invented concept, whose content is parasitic upon the previously established concept of the good. In devising the noble valuation of the good, the aristocrats only looked to themselves and what they perceived as there typical character traits. In devising the noble valuation of the good, the aristocracy was positively affirming what they took themselves to be. The noble, the well born felt themselves to be happy—as such they did not need to affirm themselves with essential reference to those whom they despised, the slaves. Furthermore such happiness was inextricable bound with activity and strength.

The bad, in the noble form of valuation, originally denotes the lowly the plebeian, the slaves. Subsequently the bad was itself associated with certain character traits. If the noble, the good were strong and brave and truthful, the bad were weak and cowardly and untruthful. Despite the evident contempt the higher ranks felt for the lower order, such contempt was tempered by a sense of forbearance and pity. If the noble and well born were happy, the bad were unhappy and pitiable. The forbearance which tempers noble contempt is itself a sign or symptom of the positive sense of self that animates the noble form of valuation. The aristocracy did not affirm itself derivatively by a display of contempt for the slaves, rather it is out of a positive sense of self that the good arises. Nietzsche employs the platonic imagery of a pale image or shadow to describe the bad as it figures in the noble mode of valuation. Just as a shadow depends for its existence and continued stability on that which casts it, so the concept of the bad depends on the prior establishment of the concept of the good for its own content and conceptual stability.

Whereas for the noble mode of evaluation the fundamental distinction is between good and bad, for the slave mode of evaluation the fundamental distinction is between good and evil. There are number of pertinent contrasts:

1. In the noble mode of evaluation “good” is conceptually prior to “bad”. In the moral mode of evaluation, “evil” is conceptually prior to “good”.
2. What the noble mode of evaluation deems good, the moral mode of evaluation deems evil.
3. In the noble mode of evaluation, the basic concept of “good” grew out of a spontaneous sense of self worth. In the moral mode of evaluation, the basic concept of “evil” grew out of a negative reaction of the weak against the strong.

This is sufficient to cast light on its application to the debate between descriptivists and prescriptivists.

1. Where descriptivists see value in novel forms of linguistic usage, prescriptivists are primarily concerned to criticize such usage.
2. What descriptivists celebrate or at least deem legitimate, prescriptivists deem bad usage, indeed ungrammatical.
3. The usage that descriptivists deem legitimate evolved spontaneously as part of the active development of language. The prescriptivists criticism of such usage is a negative reaction to such active development.

Exactly who is propagating slave morality?

Earlier I asked why resentniks seem so attracted to Nietzsche’s work. Let me offer a speculative hypothesis. I believe that this is due, in part, to a tension in Nietzsche’s work. Nietzsche’s lasting contribution to morality is his detailed description of the moral dangers of ressentiment. That his case is as compelling as it is is due, in part, to the fact that he is not himself completely free of ressentiment. Perhaps that is why he never describes himself as the ubermench, but rather casts himself in the role of a prophet foretelling his coming.