• The Second Formula
• Ends and the Determination of the Will
• Existent Ends, Absolute Worth, and Ends in Themselves
• The Derivation
  • The Negative Argument
  • The Positive Argument
• Applying the Formula of Humanity
  • Suicide
  • False Promises
  • Rusting Talents
  • Refusing Aid

The Second Formula

Whereas the first formula of the supreme principle of morality specifies the form of the moral law—its validity for all rational beings, the second formula specifies its matter (G 4:436)—the end involved in acting on a law valid for all rational beings:

• The Formula of Universal Law: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” (G 4:429; 4:436)

Ends and the Determination of the Will

Ends are that for the sake of which we act. Kant distinguishes between two kinds of ends:

1. Objective ends, i.e., ends given by reason alone that are valid for all rational beings;
2. Subjective ends, i.e., ends given by inclination that can vary from one rational being to another.

Kant calls objective ends “motives” and subjective ends “incentives.” Every action has end: We always act for the sake of some end or another. So in acting from duty we act for the sake of some end. Since the moral law is valid for all rational beings the end involved in acting from duty must be an objective end or motive.

When Kant describes the nature of motives, he is providing additional information about what it means to act from duty. In the first section, Kant characterized acting from duty as acting from respect for the moral law. Respect for the law was so far conceived to merely be to the determination of the will by a law valid for all rational beings and consciousness of this. This, however, only describes the “form” of the law but not its “matter.” In the first section, Kant remarks that he “does not yet see what this respect is based upon (this the philosopher may investigate)” (G 4:403). Kant is now conducting just this philosophical investigation. In describing the nature of motives, Kant is describing the end involved in acting from duty that is the basis of our respect for the moral law.

Existent Ends, Absolute Worth, and Ends in Themselves

Subjective ends or incentives, ends given by inclination, have only a conditional value or worth and, hence, are “only the grounds of hypothetical imperatives” (G 4:428). Objective ends or motives, ends given by reason alone, have a different significance:

But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it, and in it alone, would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, that is, of a practical law.

Kant, in describing the nature of motives or objective ends, is supposing the existence of something that has three distinct features:

1. It is an end in itself
2. It is an existent end
3. It has absolute worth

Let’s consider these in turn.

First, Kant is supposing the existence of something that is an end in itself or an objective end. An end in itself is something whose worth is unconditional, independent of inclination, and valid for all rational beings. Kant contrasts ends in themselves with relative ends, ends whose worth is conditional and dependent on inclination which varies from one rational being to another. Relative ends could only be incentives and, hence, could only be the grounds of hypothetical imperatives (G 4:428).

Second, Kant is supposing the existence of an existent end or independently existing end (G 4:437). An existent end is something that already exists and “whose existence is in itself an end” (G 4:428). Kant contrasts existent ends with ends to be effected. An end to be effected is something that does not yet exist but can be brought about by action (G 4:437). It is tempting to suppose that there is nothing more to the concept of an end than a state of affairs to be brought about by action. But the concept of an end is broader than that. An end is that for the sake of which we act. We can act for the sake of a state of affairs to be brought about by action but we can act for the sake of other ends as well. We can act for the sake of our self-preservation and continued well-being. These cannot be brought about by our actions but are already existing states of affairs that we merely preserve and do not act against.

Third, Kant is supposing the existence of something that has absolute worth. The contrast might be with things with relative worth. So understood things with absolute value would be ends in themselves. Kant, however, might mean more than this. Kant might be supposing the existence of something with dignity, a value that cannot be measured against the value of anything else (G 4:434). Kant contrasts dignity with price. An end with only relative worth, or price, can be measured against the value of something else and may be sacrificed to obtain something else of equivalent or greater worth.

These three features are conceptually distinct. Thus, nonrational animals are plausibly examples of existent ends that neither have absolute value nor are ends in themselves. Nevertheless, Kant claims that there is exactly one thing that has all three features—humanity or rational nature. Indeed, Kant seems to claim that humanity is an end in itself by being an existent end with absolute worth or dignity.

The Derivation

At this point Kant has argued that in order for a categorical imperative to motivate the will of a rational being it must involve an end in itself as a ground of the rational will. Supposing there is such a thing as an end in itself, what could it be? Kant’s answer comes in two stages. The first stage is negative: Kant considers three kinds of things we consider to be either valuable or sources of value and argues that they are not ends in themselves. These are:

1. The objects of inclination
2. The inclinations themselves
3. Nonrational beings whose existence does not depend on our will

The second stage is positive: Kant argues that humanity or rational nature is an end in itself.

The Negative Argument

Objects of Inclination. An end in itself, if it is the end involved in acting from duty, must have a worth or value valid for all rational beings. However, the objects of inclination only have value for those who are so inclined. The value of an object of inclination is contingent upon the existence of that inclination: “All objects of the inclinations have only conditional worth; for, if there were not inclinations and the needs based on them, their object would be without worth” (G 4:428). Since their worth depends on the existence of the relevant inclination, and these can vary from one rational being to another, objects of inclination cannot be ends in themselves.

Inclinations Themselves. Kant argues that (G 4:428): “the inclinations themselves, as sources of needs, are so far from having absolute worth, so as to make one wish to have them, that it must instead be the universal wish of every rational being to be altogether free from them.” This is an extraordinary claim. How are we to make sense of it? Kant seems to think that the inclinations themselves are not valued simply as such any more than their objects are. Moreover, even when we do value the objects of inclination, we don’t necessarily value the inclination considered as the source of that value. That it is not irrational to wish to be altogether free of them can be understood as a hyperbolic expression of this latter claim. Kant might also be dramatically contrasting the absolute value or dignity of ends in themselves with the value of things with merely relative worth or price. Kant now infers: “Thus the worth of any object to be acquired by our action is always conditional” (G 4:428). Thus an end in itself must be an existent end

Nonrational Beings. Existent ends are pre-existing things for the sake of which we act. These might be rational beings or nonrational beings. Ends in themselves may be existing ends but these existing ends could not be nonrational beings (G 4:428):

Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings without reason, still have only relative worth, as means, and are therefore called things, whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as an end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means, and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect).

This is unconvincing. The ordinary distinction between persons and things may presuppose that things are of lesser value than persons but it does not obviously commit us to valuing them merely as means. However, Kant might be anticipating the positive argument from which this might be derived as a consequence.

The Positive Argument

If the objects of inclination, the inclinations themselves, and nonrational beings whose existence does not depend on our will are not ends in themselves, then what is? We know that ends in themselves must be existent ends but cannot be nonrational beings, so an existent end that is an end in itself must at least inhere in rational beings. Specifically, it must be humanity or rational nature. While Kant cannot demonstrate this, he argues that we necessarily, if implicitly, presuppose this. Kant’s positive argument has four steps:

The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. (1) The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way; so far it is thus a subjective principle of human actions. (2) But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way consequent on just the same rational ground that also holds for me; (3) thus it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible to derive all laws of the will. (4) The practical imperative will therefore be the following: So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.

(1) cannot be read as a contingent empirical claim about how people explicitly value their own existence for so interpreted it would be false–unfortunately some people regard their existence as being without worth. So how are we to understand (1)? According to Kant, our humanity or rational nature consists, at least in part, in our capacity to set ends (G 4:437). Given this, Kant might be understood as claiming that when we value the ends we set for ourselves, we must, implicitly at least, value our capacity to set these ends (whether or not we explicitly value this capacity in our own person). If we didn’t, what confidence could we have on the value we place on these ends? Our capacity to set ends is an existent end whose value is unconditional—at least it does not depend on the ends we set or on our inclinations. Moreover the capacity to set ends is confined to rational beings. So far, humanity is a good candidate for being an end in itself. But before he can conclude that it is, Kant must establish that humanity has a worth or value valid for all rational beings. This is why, at this point, he merely describes himself as establishing a “subjective principle of human action.” However, our rational nature is a nature that we share with other rational beings. Thus (2) claims that every rational being also represents its own existence as an end in itself “on just the same rational ground” that holds for every other rational being, i.e., their rational nature. So we must understand the value of rational nature as an objective value, valid for all rational beings. So as (3) claims, all rational beings are ends in themselves and this makes an objective claim on all rational beings to recognize themselves and others as ends in themselves. This leads to (4): the formulation of the categorical imperative as the requirement to use humanity in every rational being always as an end and never only as a means.

Applying the Formula of Humanity

What the Formula of Humanity demands of our actions is that they express proper respect for the dignity of humanity. It thus postulates an expressive reason for doing things. This kind of reason is familiar from everyday life. Very often it is the expressive meaning of an action that constitutes at least part of the reason for performing that action. Thus saying “thank you” expresses gratitude, and this is part of the reason we thank people. This kind of reason motivates people to salute the flag or make a rude remark. So the formula of humanity requires that we treat humanity as an end an never merely as a means in order to express respect for the dignity of humanity.

Notice the Formula of Humanity does not forbid our using another person as a means. When you buy a stamp from a postal clerk you are using the postal clerk as a means for acquiring that stamp despite the clerk’s evident humanity, but there is nothing morally amiss in this. Rather what is forbidden is omitting to treat a person “at the same time as an end.” Thus the injunction to treat people “never merely as a means” is redundant: The moral content of the Formula of Humanity consists entirely in the injunction to treat people as ends.

So why emphasize that one should never treat people merely as a means? The empahsis can be interpreted as a rhetorical response to a diagnosis of human wrongdoing. Human beings have a tendency to act contrary to duty, not because they altogether fail to value humanity, but because they misconceive the kind of value it has. Thus, as human beings, we have a tendency to place greater value on the objects of inclination, which merely have a “price” or “relative worth,” over the value of humanity, which has instead a “dignity” or “absolute worth.” This both complements and illuminates the moral point of the first formula. Kant observes that normally, when we act contrary to duty, we will “that the opposite of our maxim should instead remain a universal law, only we take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves (or just for this once) to the advantage of our inclination” (G 4:424). So in acting contrary to duty, a person gives unjustifiable preference to his own inclinations over the inclinations of other finite rational beings. Notice that, when we make an exception for ourselves, we fail to express proper respect for the dignity of humanity in ourselves or in the person of others. Indeed, Kant anticipates this explicit connection when in the first section he observes that human beings possess:

…a propensity to rationalize aginst those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their dignity [my emphasis]—something that even common rational cognition cannot, in the end, call good. (G 4:405)

In making an exception for ourselves, we sacrifice the dignity of humanity in the person of another for a mere price and, hence, fail to properly respect that dignity.

Suicide

The general duty not to commit suicide is derived from the expressive meaning of the act itself which Kant holds to be “degrading to the humanity in one’s own person” (Ms 6:422-3). In taking one’s life one fails to respect the dignity of one’s own humanity for one exhanges it for the price of maintaining “a tolerable condition up to the end of life” (G 4:429).

This deepens the case against suicide made on the basis of the first formula. Recall, Kant argued that since self-love has the natural function of furthering life, it is self-contradictory to suppose that there could be a system of nature that includes a law that under circumstances of more troubles than agreeableness self-love endeavors to shorten life. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant argues that we should respect the natural functions of our instinctive drives since they belong to the predisposition to animality that underpins our rational nature. Hence to use instinctive drives contrary to their natural function is to show disrespect for the humanity in one’s own person. The argument against suicide is not so much based on whether the maxim passes the contradiction in conception test as it is based on an appeal to treat self-love with proper respect for its natural function (where the basis of the appeal is the dignity of the humanity that this function underpins).

False Promises

We have a duty not to make promises that we do not intend to keep since making such promises treats those we deceive merely as a means for our own ends “without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they must always be valued at the same time as ends” (G 4:430). The ground of this duty is the failure of our act to express respect for the humanity in the person lied to. The false promiser:

…wants to make use of another human being merely as a means, without the other at the same time containing in himself the end. For, he whom I want to use for my purposes by such a promise cannot possibly agree to my way of behaving toward him, and so himself contain the end of this action. (G 4:429-30)

The deepens the case against false promises made on the basis of the first formula. If the giving and accepting of promises requires that promiser and promisee share their ends, then it is clear why promising would be impossible if it were a universal law of nature that everyone makes false promises when in need of money since this would preclude such sharing. Even making falses promises to Jones on the second Tuesday of the month would be precluded on this basis. Doing so would fail to respect the dignity of Jones’ humanity.

Rusting talents

We have a duty to develop our capacities in order that our actions should “harmonize” with the end of humanity in our own person. This duty is not grounded on the advantages to be accrued by cultivating our talents. Kant is making no appeal to utility here. Rather we show respect for our rational nature by putting at its disposal the capacity to acheive a wide variety of ends, and it is this, rather than any interest in the ends themselves, which is the basis of our duty to perfect ourselves.

This deepens the case against rusting talents made on the basis of the first formula. The argument from the Formula of the Law of Nature appealed to the fact that “as a rational being he necessarily wills that all the capacities in him be developed, since they serve him and are given to him for all sorts of possible purposes” (G 4:423). Kant failed, however, to specify the rational principle from which he derives this result. It is an open question whether rusting talents are inconsistent with the counsels of prudence, say. The argument from the Formula of the Law of Nature does not show why a rational being would will such a thing, but the argument from the Formula of Humanity does show this. A rational being necessarily wills that all capacities in him be developed in order to show respect for his rational nature.

Refusing aid

We have a duty to further the ends of others in order to bring our actions into harmony “with humanity as an end in itself:”

For, the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must as far as possible be also my ends, if that representation is to have its full effect in me. (G 4:430)

The representation of an end in itself is the representation of human beings as valuable, with the dignity accorded to rational beings. To let this conception have full effect on me is to allow my valuing rational beings to be exhibited in my actions towards them. Thus the reason we should help those in need is that we thereby show respect for their dignity as rational beings.

This deepens the case against refusing to help made on the basis of the first formula. One problem for that argument was why a rugged individualist could not will that others not help him on the condition that he should be exempt from helping them. The argument from the Formula of Humanity shows why. The reason it would be impossible for a rugged individualist to will that others not help him is that their refusal would show contempt for his humanity which he must regard as an end in itself. Insofar as their existence contains the same rational grounds for respect, it would be equally impossible for the rugged individualist to will that he should not extend the same help to them.