

# Reason, Value, and Duty

## Lecture Four

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15 March 2007 / Ethics

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- Moral internalism establishes that this nonmoral reason must be practical
- Humean psychology establishes that only desires are practical

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## A Difference in Strategy

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- **Foot's Strategy:** Recognize that acting morally is part of what it means to act rationally.

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# The Nature of Virtue

- What distinguishes the virtuous from the nonvirtuous person is their differential capacities to treat certain considerations as reasons for acting
- Practical goodness recommends the epistemic perspective of the virtuous person; acting virtuously is acting well


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## Foot and Internalism

Foot accepts moral internalism but rejects the explanation given of it by a Humean psychology of desire

## The Second Horn



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