

# Reason, Value, and Duty

## Prichard's Dilemma

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# Dissolution

- The skeptic challenges us to give a reason why we should do what we took to be our duty. No moral reason will convince him, and, as Prichard has argued, no nonmoral reason is adequate. Does that mean moral skepticism is vindicated?
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# Intuitionism and Particularism

- **Intuitionism** is foundationalism in moral epistemology and is not committed to a special moral sense understood as a quasi-perceptual faculty by means of which our duty is known
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# A Problem for Prichard

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
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- But (without being a demand for non-moral proof) the question might also be an intelligible request about the normative significance of this non-moral information

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# The Second Horn



# Higher-Order Attitudes



Perhaps, the difference between what we want and what we are obliged to do is a matter of there being a coherently integrated system of higher-order noncognitive attitudes



# Coherence and Revision

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- But when first- and second-order desires conflict, coherence can be achieved by revising either

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